Power distribution in complex environmental negotiations: Does balance matter?
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
By: N. Burkardt, B. L. Lamb, and J.G. Taylor
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Abstract
We studied six interagency negotiations covering Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) hydroelectric power licenses. Negotiations occurred between state and federal resource agencies and developers over project operations and natural resource mitigation. We postulated that a balance of power among parties was necessary for successful negotiations. We found a complex relationship between balanced power and success and conclude that a balance of power was associated with success in these negotiations. Power played a dynamic role in the bargaining and illuminates important considerations for regulatory design.
| Publication type | Article |
|---|---|
| Publication Subtype | Journal Article |
| Title | Power distribution in complex environmental negotiations: Does balance matter? |
| Series title | Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Year Published | 1997 |
| Language | English |
| Larger Work Type | Article |
| Larger Work Subtype | Journal Article |
| Larger Work Title | Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory |
| First page | 247 |
| Last page | 275 |
| Google Analytic Metrics | Metrics page |